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Management Summary  
The need for uniform banking regulations was recognized in the mid nineteen thirties by 
several countries. The global financial crisis beginning in 2007 was the trigger event for 
the third and as of today last Basel accord. In 2009 the first draft of Basel III was already 
submitted, featuring stricter capital rules and marking the first incentive to issue CoCo 
bonds by the regulator. The combination of a young market and the lack of comparable 
securities leads to a shortage in statistical evaluations, analysing the drivers of the CoCo 
market. The high importance of such data is explainable by the big market size and the 
investors need for transparency, to evaluate potential risks when deciding to invest in 
CoCo bonds. 
 
The drivers of CoCo bonds are analysed over the last 3.5 years and compared to bench-
mark indices. The impact the factors have will be displayed and discussed for all indica-
tors, macro, market and bond-specific indicators subsequently. 
 
The first part gives a qualitative overview on the banking regulation history, explains how 
CoCo bonds work and what the important features are. In the quantitative part, a bond 
sample of 14 bonds with daily yields was extracted. The traced time frame was between 
the 30.09.2015 and the 05.04.2019. To determine the influence every factor has on CoCo 
yields a single and multi-regression analysis was performed based on OLS. 
 
It was found that equity markets influence CoCo markets in a strong manner. Specifically, 
equity indices like EURO STOXX 50 and EURO STOXX banks can explain relevant 
parts of the variance of the yield. Also, non-bank related indices have an even bigger 
explanatory factor for yields variance in a single regression analysis. On the other hand, 
the influence of the single equity price of the issuing banks is rather small, underlining 
reaction on systemic events and market movements. Stating the influence of equity mar-
kets on CoCo bonds, an unexplainable detachment of both markets was detected, which 
took place over the last six months. Separately, a clear relation between distance to trigger 
and yields was established with a linear and non-linear model. 
 
In conclusion, the distance to trigger will gain relevance in accessing CoCo bonds as an 
investment, taking into consideration that regulators decide not to use PONV triggers in 
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an early stage. Also, global equity markets are even stronger recognized as drivers of 
CoCo bonds, compared to their benchmarks. Single equities will remain important within 
the set of drivers for CoCo bonds, but for rather company-specific events. This conclusion 
shall be seen as universally applicable and is a gain for the understanding of CoCo bonds 
and especially for quantifying CoCo drivers. 
 
To further enhance statistical models, an ongoing analysis of the market is proposed. Big-
ger sample groups will become available and analysis during sharply contrasting eco-
nomic cycles shall be made. Also, an additional paper could investigate the reasons be-
hind the shrinking correlation of CoCo bonds and equity markets. Furthermore, additional 
trigger events shall be awaited to gather further precedent cases. 
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1 Introduction 
Once the banking crisis hit the global markets during the years of 2007-2009, global cap-
ital markets became highly complex and interdependent on each other. In addition, it be-
came obvious that current bank capital was at a historical low and hence unable to absorb 
losses (Martynova & Perotti, 2018, p. 1). When the U.S. mortgage market collapsed, 
losses started to add up to amounts even threatening bankruptcy to certain financial insti-
tutions, marking the moment the too-big-to-fail debate started to get traction among reg-
ulators and politicians (Erismann, 2015, p. 1). Accepting the fact that certain banks and 
insurances are simply too big and therefore too heavily intertwined with the corporate 
world and private investors, governments had to step in. Numerous banks, including 
Swiss-based UBS, had to be rescued with government aid, as damage to the national and 
global system was seen as a bigger issue than the rescue cost.  
 
During the analysis of the crisis, one of the most stressed topics was expectedly bank 
capital. To address the issue new regulations were put in place. Eventually, this led to the 
implementation of the third Basel framework in 2014, called Basel III. The new frame-
work can be split up into three main pillars, which will be explained in detail in the third 
chapter. One pillar essentially stresses a rise in minimum common equity requirements 
from 2% to 4.5% of RWAs. A promoted way to ramp up capital is the CoCo bond. After 
gaining popularity among fixed-income investors and banks to increase their AT1 capital, 
CoCo’s have become an increasingly complex and regulatory driven market. 
 
Gradually coming into force, the implementation of the new framework was finished on 
the first of January 2019 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011, p. 26). A pick-up in issuance of 
CoCo bonds was already noticeable in 2014, when issuance almost tripled to 123bn USD 
compared to 2013, when issuance was standing at 41.85bn USD (Bloomberg L.P.).  
 
This thesis will first explain the current state of the literature in a dedicated part. Relevant 
papers will be presented, theories developed, and directions outlined. Thereafter, the reg-
ulatory context of banking regulations will be explained in detail, in order to understand 
how CoCo bonds developed. The world before Basel, and the Basel accords Basel I, Basel 
II and Basel III will all be addressed separately. Relevant parts for the structure of banking 
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capital will be presented and explained. Also, the Swiss finish will be touched and briefly 
summarized at the end of the section.  
The next chapter will focus on the function of CoCo bonds and their design features, 
illustrating the functionality of the paper, explaining relevant design specifications. 
A quantitative part will clarify and analyse the drivers of CoCo bonds based on a sample 
group of CoCo bonds. The influence of several factors will be examined and, where pos-
sible, compared to benchmark indices. Thereafter, the results will be analysed, and a con-
clusion will be drawn.  
 
The research question can be formulated as follows: What drives yields of CoCo bonds 
compared to benchmarks and on a standalone basis? 
 
2 Literature Review 
Even before the first CoCo bond was issued in 2009, literature started covering the topic 
and has evolved since then. Merton (1974) has laid the foundation stone when publishing 
an article on pricing corporate debt in 1974. The value of the bank Vt is defined by the 
equity value Et and the outstanding risky debt value Dt at time t (Partanen, 2016, p. 16):  
 
Vt = Et + Dt.  
 
As the bank is modelled with only equity and debt, the debt gets paid back if the total 
value of the company Vt is bigger than the outstanding risky debt Dt at time t. When at 
maturity total risky debt Dt is bigger than the total value of the company Vt, the share-
holders will choose to walk away with the equity value Et at zero, rather than making 
extra cash injections (Merton, 1974, p. 453). Hence, the equity can be priced using the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model, designing a call option, as only the upside is unlimited, 
whereas downside risk is floored at the default level (Partanen, 2016, p. 16). Rearranging 
the formula and solving it for the value of the risky debt, we get the following formula 
(Partanen, 2016, p. 16): 
 
Dt = Vt-Et  
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Now, risky debt Dt can be priced, showing one of the first possibilities to price a CoCo 
bond, not yet existing at that time. Since then, the literature has evolved, and major events 
have even accelerated the number of publications.  
 
Subsequent to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, we saw a massive pickup in the publica-
tion of papers related to CoCo’s. As of today, they do not solely have a theoretical focus 
but concentrate on a variety of practical topics. In addition, as a consequence of the im-
plementation process of CoCo bonds within the banking regulation and the promotion of 
the security by banking regulators into national law, one could observe another player 
stepping in as a publisher, the local and international regulators.  
 
Generally speaking, we can categorize all related publications related into two main cat-
egories. The main direction is related to pricing. We can split this area into two subdivi-
sions, derivative models and credit models. De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012, p. 1) 
have their derivate pricing approach split into two parts, credit derivatives and equity 
derivatives. A so-called default parameter is used to determine credit spreads. De Spie-
geleer and Schoutens (2012) determine λ as the probability of bankruptcy. To convert λ 
into a suitable variable to price a CoCo bonds credit spread, De Spiegeleer and Schoutens 
propose a λ corrected by the trigger intensity (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2012, p. 14). 
When valuing the CoCo bond with its equity derivative model, the approach is more re-
lated to derivatives. The fixed income structure is replicated by a zero-coupon bond. The 
share conversion, triggered once the respective CET1 ratio is touched, is reproduced by 
a knock-in forward. Potential coupon cancellation in case of a trigger event is considered 
in the model with short positions on every coupon date in binary down and in options (De 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2012, p. 22). Corcuera et al. (2013) work with an advanced pric-
ing model and try to take into account an “exponential Lévy process incorporating jumps 
and heavy tails”. While some pricing models focus on the normal distribution, Corcuera 
et al. (2013) price CoCo’s while using the Variance Gamma (V.G. model) model. The 
V.G. model uses longer tails than the normal distribution. Over time, as longer data sets 
are added, V.G. approaches normality (Madan & Seneta, 1990, p. 522). Himmelberg and 
Tsyplakov (2012) combine a dynamic pricing model with the incentives CoCo bonds 
should have on issuers. It puts the possibility of dilution when raising new equity into 
perspective regarding a possible dilution from a conversion of the CoCo bond into equity. 
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The model takes two parameters into consideration to calculate the optimal equilibrium, 
conversion price and relative CoCo bond size (Himmelberg & Tsyplakov, 2012, p. 15). 
A more recent publication dealing with pricing is Leung and Kwok (2017). Making use 
of the Fortet method, the authors designed a numerical algorithm to determine the fair 
value of CoCo bonds. The Fortet method was extended by two additional input values. 
At first, the possibility to add two barriers to the equation was incorporated, considering 
the mechanical CET1 trigger and also the higher warning threshold (Leung & Kwok, 
2017, p. 4). In addition, a Parisian state variable is implemented (Leung & Kwok, 2017, 
p. 4). Parisian options are knocked-in or -out only after the underlying price has broken a 
level and stayed there for a predefined time (Haber, Schönbucher, & Wilmott, 1997, p. 
1). The second feature is especially crucial, as the PONV was implemented in Basel III, 
which the Parisian model helps to simulate (Avdjiev, Kartasheva, & Bogdanova, 2013, 
p. 47).  
The second major pillar, when it comes to literature on CoCo bonds, is focused on the 
regulatory design of the securities, in order to fulfil their regulatory mission best. Im-
portant here are specific features the bonds have, as well as the legal framework to support 
their proper loss absorption effects and incentive for bank management. Flannery and 
Perotti (2011) focus on the design of the implemented trigger, suggesting a market-based 
trigger such as share prices over accounting triggers. A benefit is the absence of delay 
when basing conversion on equity prices, as they are transparently quoted every day on 
the exchange. On the other hand, regulatory ratios are only published on a quarterly basis. 
Furthermore, “risk information discovery” should be reflected in equity prices, making 
bondholders activists at some point (Flannery & Perotti, 2011, p. 7). Other supporters of 
market-based triggers are Calomiris and Herring (2013). Here, instead of taking simple 
equity prices as a trigger, a “moving average of a quasi-market-value-of-equity ratio” is 
proposed (Calomiris & Herring, 2013, p. 83). Conversion into equity is favoured over 
principal write-down. When converting in to equity, a dilution for current shareholders is 
proposed. It is stated that once a conversion occurs, the dilution to current shareholders 
should be bigger than a stock offering, encouraging banks to raise new equity and keeping 
the order between bondholder and shareholders (Calomiris & Herring, 2013, p. 72). 
McDonald (2013) expands the simple equity price-based trigger model with a second 
price trigger, related to the industry health. To convert debt into equity, the share price 
needs to fall below a certain level. In addition, an equity index representing the health of 
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the banking industry will be used as a second trigger. Only once both triggers are reached 
conversion takes place (McDonald, 2013, p. 4). Hart and Zigales (2010) classify CET1 
triggers as not useful when set at current levels, mentioning the absence of any trigger 
event during the crisis of 2007-2009, as the trigger level of 5% is too low. On the other 
hand, triggers linked to equity prices are rejected, identifying risks of market manipula-
tion by a management interested in conversion. The proposed solution is a market-based 
trigger, linked to CDS levels that are compared to last month’s levels. It is stated that 
CDS levels would have predicted the riskiest financial institutions during the credit crisis. 
Also, CDS triggers would have forced banks to issue equity already in the autumn of 2007 
for the first time (Hart & Zingales, 2010). The Squam Lake Working Group (2009) sug-
gests an accounting and a regulatory trigger to convert. The regulatory trigger is met once 
the regulator declares “that the financial system is suffering from a systemic crisis” 
(Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, 2009, p. 4). Furthermore, the ac-
counting trigger tier 1 compared to RWAs is proposed (Squam Lake Working Group on 
Financial Regulation, 2009, p. 4). It is also recommended to issue long term debt, which 
later manifested in the dominant issuance of perpetual CoCo’s (Squam Lake Working 
Group on Financial Regulation, 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, the phenomenon of the death 
spiral is explained and put forward to underpin arguments in favour of accounting triggers 
versus market-based triggers. The death spiral describes a situation in which the threat of 
dilution pushes an already falling share price even lower. This, in consequence, leads to 
even more dilution and an even lower stock price in consequence again (Squam Lake 
Working Group on Financial Regulation, 2009, p. 5). 
Due to the relatively young age of the market, a statistical evaluation of multiple bonds 
over a longer time period was not possible until now. This thesis will focus on statistical 
data of the last 3.5 years, determining the drivers of the CoCo market and their impact. It 
should be the first interpretation of several variables possibly impacting bond yields, 
which should be followed by more statistic reviews as the CoCo market is maturing. 
3 Regulatory context  
3.1 The world before Basel regulations  
Before financial regulations were applied globally and comprehensive capital require-
ments were invented, banking regulations were a national topic. The most commonly used 
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measurement technique to determine if a bank’s capital cushion was sufficient was the 
ratio between equity and total assets (Hull, 2018, p. 369).  
 
3.1.1 Germany 
In Europe, Germany decided to introduce the country’s first national banking regulation 
in September 1931. The law was based on the constitution of the Weimar Republic and 
an emergency decree. The law was a reaction to the bankruptcy of the Danat-Bank on the 
31.07.1931, triggered by low equity and insufficiency liquidity. On the 05.12.1934, the 
base for today’s banking supervision was laid when the law for credit was implemented. 
At first, the topics of equity, liquidity and credit business were mentioned, and relevant 
rules implemented (Lessenich, 2014, p. 15).  
 
3.1.2 Switzerland  
Switzerland faced similar issues as Germany before implementing a national banking 
regulation. After Swiss banks started to generate huge revenues when opening credit lines 
to Germany, the boom was abruptly stopped by a sharp economic downturn in the then 
German Reich. Facing losses, national pressure for a regulatory solution started to mount 
up. Before a national law was applied, banks refused to obey a law regulating their busi-
ness. Even after the crisis, the 1934 Swiss Bankers Association report mentioned the 
threat of banking regulation as “bank police legislation”. Switzerland ultimately followed 
through in 1935, implementing the federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks as a national 
solution (Vogler, 2012).  
 
3.1.3 Global issues 
Differences in banking regulations and inexistent global minimum capital requirements 
were not only an issue for systemic stability. In an increasingly complex and competitive 
world, banks started to compete for business internationally. In consequence, banks op-
erating from countries with looser capital requirements had a competitive advantage 
(Hull, 2018, p. 369). In addition, complex derivative transactions further impacted credit 
risks. Banks did not consider arising counterparty risks from these transactions, as the 
regulatory framework did not foresee these developments on the product side. Hence, the 
need for a global framework was recognized. In 1974, the Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision was founded by twelve countries, Switzerland being among them (Hull, 
2018, p. 370).  
 
3.2 Basel I 
In 1988, the first of today’s three Basel accords was passed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. It was directed at banks involved in international business. The 
voluntary status was made compulsory when regulators started to implement the recom-
mendations into its framework and passed them into national law (Lessenich, 2014, p. 
16).  
 
Two major goals are stated by the Basel committee. Firstly, an enhancement of the cre-
ditworthiness and stability of the international banking system should be reached. Sec-
ondly, the framework should be uniformly applicable to banks operating from different 
countries to avoid competitive distortion (Basel Committee on banking supervision, 1988, 
p. 1). Terms such as the RWA were first implemented combined with the Cooke-Ratio, 
measuring the total capital compared to the RWA. One of the main outputs were the static 
risk weightings in table 1 below, to value balance sheet positions and calculate the result-
ing RWA (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996): 
 
Risk weight in % Asset category 
0 Cash, gold bars, government OECD-
Bonds 
20 Claims against OECD-Banks and public 
OECD-Institutions  
50 Unsecured mortgage claims  
100 Other claims including corporate bonds, 
government bonds from non-OECD coun-
tries, non-OECD banks credits, commer-
cial premises and factories 
Table 1: Risk weights for balance sheet positions Basel I (Hull, 2018, p. 371) 
 
The committee came to the conclusion that total equity should be standing at a minimum 
of 8% compared to the total RWA (Basel Committee on banking supervision, 1988, p. 
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15). At least 4% of those should be covered by core equity tier 1 capital, hence by share 
capital and reported reserves. The focus on both share capital and reported reserves was 
mainly justified by the fact that these two parts of the balance sheet were the only common 
part in capital structure across international legislation (Basel Committee on banking 
supervision, 1988, pp. 3-4). The other 4% could be covered by tier 2 capital, including 
undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, hybrid capital 
instruments and subordinated debt. Furthermore, tier 2 capital was ruled not to exceed the 
tier 1 capital (Basel Committee on banking supervision, 1988, p. 17). The 1996 amend-
ment was mainly focused on market risks, arising from trading activities banks were in-
volved in (Hull, 2018, p. 377). A third capital type, tier 3, was invented subsequently to 
absorb parts of the risk arising from market exposure. Tier 3 capital had to be unsecured, 
subordinated, not repayable before maturity and could waive coupon payments if they 
would lower the bank’s capital below a certain level (Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1996, pp. 7-8).  
 
3.3 Basel II 
In 1999, the Basel committee already proposed new regulations, in the form of Basel II. 
In June 2004, the final version was published and began to be implemented in 2007 (Hull, 
2018, pp. 379-380). Accord number two was based on a three-pillar principle, consisting 
of the following pillars: minimum capital requirement, supervisory review process and 
market discipline (Lessenich, 2014, p. 22). This paper will focus on pillar one and three, 
which relate the closest to capital requirements and market mechanisms important for 
CoCo bonds.  
 
3.3.1 Minimum capital requirements  
When designing capital requirements in Basel II, the original 8% threshold was kept un-
changed. Also, the minimum capital requirement for market-risk was not changed from 
the 1996 amendment. An addition to already existing market-risk and credit-risk was the 
newly implemented operational risk (Hull, 2018, p. 380). To capture those risks, banks 
are enabled to pick different systems. The main distinction is made between the standard 
approach and the AMA (Lessenich, 2014, p. 23). When deciding for the AMA, an ap-
proval from the regulator must be obtained for the respective model (Lessenich, 2014, p. 
28). Commitment to the more sophisticated and complicated AMA leads to a discharge 
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of equity compared to the standard approach (Lessenich, 2014, p. 27). The Basel com-
mittee thereby tries to incentivize banks towards AMA. A tailor-made solution should 
lead to a better understanding of internal risks, better risk management and improved risk 
measurement systems (Lubbe & Snyman, 2010, p. 142). Still, it seems too complicated 
or unfavourable for the bigger part of the banks to implement AMA. While 1579 credit 
institutions were licensed to do business in Germany in the year of 2017, only 13 institu-
tions had an AMA implemented and were using this method to determine their capital 
requirement (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), 2017, p. 176/178). 
On the other hand, the more popular standard-approach was updated. In Basel I, the cre-
ditworthiness of the counterparty was not reflected at all when weighing the credit. The 
main focus was on the membership in the OECD. In Basel II, the distinctive point when 
valuing credit weightings was the credit rating. Below, table 2 reflects different rating 
classes and their respective weighting: 
 
 AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ - 
BBB- 
BB+ to 
BB- 
B+ to B- Below 
B- 
Not 
rated 
Country 0% 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
Banks 20% 50% 50% 100% 100% 150% 50% 
Corpo-
rates 
20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 150% 100% 
Table 2: Risk weights for credit positions Basel II (Hull, 2018, p. 381) 
 
A few specialities should be mentioned. First, completely unrated clients will be rated 
less risky than clients who obtained a rating of B- or lower (Hull, 2018, pp. 381-382). 
Also, some flexibility was left to national regulators on the implementation of the risk 
weightings. When the debt owed is in local currency and refinanced in the same currency, 
risk weightings could be adjusted for central banks and for the country in which the banks 
operate (Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht, 2006, p. 23). This special rule was applied 
for countries of the European Union and the ECB by the European Union (Europäische 
Union, 2006, p. 81). This move essentially erases rating differences within the EU, mir-
roring the Basel I approach.  
A newly implemented obligation to measure operational risk was presented with three 
possibilities. The base indicator approach focuses on gross net income. Necessary equity 
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is calculated by multiplying gross net income by the static factor of 0.15 (Hull, 2018, p. 
390). The standard approach has the same mechanism as the basis indicator approach. 
The only difference is the variety of factors applied, ranging from 0.12 to 0.18, depending 
on the business area and the risk it bears. The third approach is again the AMA, based on 
internal bank models and is subject to regulatory approval (Lessenich, 2014, p. 28). 
 
3.3.2 Market discipline  
The third pillar focuses on market discipline, in essence boosting transparency towards 
market participants (Hull, 2018, p. 391). Market participants should be able to get insight 
into bank’s common equity and major risk positions. In consequence, they should be able 
to derive if the bank equity is sufficient (Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht, 2006, p. 
256). All major international banks have to disclose their CET1 ratios on a quarterly basis 
(Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht, 2006, p. 258). These steps should lead to more 
transparent pricing of debt and equity markets of those banks, giving banks with good 
capital bolsters better refinancing conditions (Lessenich, 2014, p. 32). 
 
3.4 Basel III 
Following the global economic crisis that started in 2007, the Basel committee, national 
banking regulators and national politics were pushing towards stricter minimum capital 
rules. Basel III is, therefore, the direct reaction to the crisis and addresses the lessons 
learned from the credit crunch and the accords before (Rüdlinger, 2015, p. 12). The first 
draft was already submitted in December 2009, while the final version was presented in 
2010 (Hull, 2018, p. 404).  
 
3.4.1 Common equity structure 
Basel III has its main focus placed on the evolution of the capital structure. Before the 
financial crisis took place, a pick-up in hybrid capital was observed, which is not as useful 
for loss absorption (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011, p. 7). Addressing this problem, the Ba-
sel III accord amended the capital structure, eliminated certain capital classes and changed 
the weightings within the buckets. Below, figure 1 displays how the structure was 
changed from Basel II to Basel III: 
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Figure 1: Capital structure evolution in Basel III (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011, p. 10) 
 
At first, the third capital bucket covering market risk was eliminated completely (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011, p. 2). Total minimum capital still remains at 
8% compared to the RWA. After a transition period that ended in 2015, banks are now 
required to hold at least 6% of the total 8% in tier 1 capital, compared to 4% in Basel II. 
Also, a distinction is made for the first time between CET1 and AT1 capital. Of the 6%, 
4.5% have to be CET1 eligible capital, which in fact is mostly share capital (Lessenich, 
2014, p. 39). There were 14 points defined to determine whether capital qualifies as 
CET1, two of which are the non-callability and the last payment rank in the case of bank-
ruptcy (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011, pp. 15-16). Up to 1.5% are eli-
gible to come from the new bucket, AT1, which has the covenants displayed in the table 
1 in the attachment (Lessenich, 2014, p. 39). 
 
Analysing the covenants, it can be concluded that these terms mark the first incentive to 
issue CoCo bonds by the regulator. First, point 11 mentions the possibility of a conversion 
feature to classify as AT1. Distributable items are introduced as a pool from which cou-
pon payments must be made, making sure banks will not pay out money they do not have 
to bondholders. Also, coupon step-ups after the mandatory 5-year non-call period were 
banned, avoiding incentives to call at the first date. The pick-up in the issuance of CoCo 
bonds can also be explained by the implementation of additional capital buffers. A so-
called capital conservation buffer consisting of 2.5% tier 1 is implemented. This buffer 
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should be built up under normal market conditions, serving as a cushion during economic 
stress (Hull, 2018, pp. 405-406). Furthermore, a countercyclical capital buffer of up to 
2.5% tier 1 can be implemented at the local regulator’s discretion (Hull, 2018, p. 406). 
Switzerland for example implemented a sectoral countercyclical capital buffer of 1% for 
the first time in September 2013, targeting “mortgage loans financing residential property 
located in Switzerland”. The buffer was subsequently revised upwards and is now stand-
ing at 2% (Swiss National Bank, 2019, p. 1). Non-compliance in either one, countercy-
clical capital buffer and capital conservation buffer, leads to punishment in the form of 
dividend pay-out restrictions. Below, table 3 shows how a breach of tier 1, including 
countercyclical capital buffer and capital conservation buffer, affects the bank’s ability to 
pay dividends: 
Tier 1 Ratio Minimum retained profit 
4.5% - 5.75 100% 
5.75% - 7.00% 80% 
7% - 8.25% 60% 
8.25% - 9.50% 40% 
>9.50% 0% 
Table 3: Dividend pay-out restrictions considering capital conservation buffer and countercyclical 
capital buffer (Hull, 2018, p. 407) 
 
All measures concerning the capital structure and the relevant ratios were implemented 
gradually. When looking at the detailed figure 2 below, one can link the pick-up in CoCo 
bond issuance in 2014 with the rising capital requirements from this year on: 
 
CoCo Bonds - What drives their yields compared to benchmarks and on a standalone basis?
   
 
- 13 - 
 
Figure 2: Implementation time frame for capital requirements and additional buffers (Deutsche Bun-
desbank, 2011, p. 19) 
 
One of the main catalysts for international anxiety during the financial crisis was the sys-
temic relevance of certain institutions, making it necessary for governments to step in 
with taxpayers’ money to rescue them, also known as the “too big to fail” problem. For 
banks seen as too important to go bankrupt, special rules were implemented when new 
regulations were elaborated.  
Globally and systemically important banks, G-SIBs, are now rated in a ranking system, 
ranging from 0 to 629 points. To classify as a G-SIB, a minimum of 130 points must be 
obtained. The point system is based on twelve different indicators, among them assets 
under control, payment activity and outstanding securities. Five different buckets were 
put into place, with the fifth one being empty, as no bank currently reaches the necessary 
points needed to be deemed a category five bank. Banks included in a certain bucket are 
obliged to hold an additional percentage of their RWA in CET1, fully applicable from 
2019 on (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2014, p. 4). Below, table 4 shows 
the respective top-ups and an example bank for each bucket: 
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Bucket Example Score Additional CET1 
5 n/a 530-629 3.5% 
4 JP Morgan Chase 430-529 2.5% 
3 Citigroup 330-429 2% 
2 Goldman Sachs 230-329 1.5% 
1 Credit Suisse 130-229 1% 
Table 4: G-SIB classification buckets and additional CET1 levels (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2014, p. 4) / (Financial Stability Board (FSB), 2018, p. 3) 
 
Some regulators decided to put even stricter rules on their G-SIBs. Switzerland has a 
puffer target of 6.3%, including the 2.5% countercyclical puffer. The global standard is 
ranging between 3.5% and 5% (Schweizer Bundesrat, 2017, p. 4852). In addition, local 
regulators are allowed to name D-SIBs, domestically and systemically important banks. 
Switzerland decided to classify ZKB, PostFinance and Raiffeisen as D-SIB, beside the 
G-SIBs UBS and Credit Suisse (Schweizer Bundesrat, 2017, p. 4859).  
 
3.4.2 Leverage Ratio 
During the financial crisis, it was observed that banks were excessively overleveraged. 
During the market downturn, fire sales of assets lead to a negative price spiral. To address 
this issue the leverage ratio was implemented (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2011, p. 61). It measures CET1 capital compared to off-balance and on-balance sheet 
assets. The ratio calculated should be at least 3%. This 3% mark is revised upwards from 
various regulators and is also higher for G-SIB institutions  (Hull, 2018, p. 407).  
 
3.4.3 Liquidity 
Another issue banks were facing during the economic crisis was the lack of liquidity. 
Also, banks generally tend to refinance their balance sheet activities on the short end of 
the yield curve. On the other hand, their investments tend to have longer maturities, vio-
lating the principle of maturities matching, the so-called golden banking rule. During 
calm economic times, this behaviour does not pose a significant threat, as refinancing is 
available to banks on every point of the curve and in almost every size. During an eco-
nomic crisis, however, trust within the market is barely existing and refinancing becomes 
somewhat expensive or, in the worst case, impossible. This leads to a balance sheet full 
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of investments, which the bank is unable to refinance. To avoid scenarios like this, a 
consistent regulation on liquidity was imposed.  
 
The LCR is implemented to oppose short term liquidity shortage, mainly for 30 days. 
Scenarios are simulated in which the bank is downgraded multiple notches in its credit 
rating. It faces bank-run like schemes and a heavy utilisation of its credit lines. HQLA 
are divided by the calculated net-outflow from the stress scenarios. The value should al-
ways be above 100% (Lessenich, 2014, p. 54).  
 
The NSFR tackles the problem of maturities matching. To avoid excessive financing on 
the short-end, mostly even overnight, the NSFR compares the available stable refinancing 
to the necessary stable refinancing. Both numbers are extracted to cover a yearly basis; 
the quotient should always be above 100% (Lessenich, 2014, p. 409).  
 
3.5 Swiss finish 
As mentioned before, Switzerland decided to implement rules which are stricter in some 
areas than Basel III proposed. Market shares are evaluated and segregated into four dif-
ferent buckets. A higher market share results in a surcharge for target leverage-ratio and 
RWA. Banks with market shares between 22% and 27% have an RWA surcharge of 
1.08% and a leverage-ratio surcharge of 0.375%. Total engagement is measured as well, 
which also leads to certain surcharges, especially for banks with balance sheets bigger 
than 1050bn CHF, targeting G-SIBs (Der Schweizerische Bundesrat, 2012, p. 73). Both 
Swiss G-SIBs are entitled to have a CET1 ratio of at least 14.3%, versus 9.5-11% in Basel 
III, and a leverage ratio of 5%, versus 3% in Basel III. In terms of capital quality, stricter 
rules apply, too. To reach the leverage ratio, 1.5% can be obtained through CoCo’s. To 
reach the CET1 ratios, 4.3% are allowed to come from CoCo’s. It is important to know 
in both cases that only high-trigger CoCo’s are eligible for the two buckets, which have 
a CET1 trigger not lower than 7% in place (Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement, 2016, 
p. 4). The remaining capital requirement needs to be fulfilled by CET1 capital, no tier 2 
capital is eligible at all (Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement, 2016, p. 7). Below, figure 
15 shows Swiss requirements compared to standard Basel III rules for normal and for 
SIFIs: 
 
CoCo Bonds - What drives their yields compared to benchmarks and on a standalone basis?
   
 
- 16 - 
 
Figure 3: Basel III requirements compared to Swiss implementation (Rüdlinger, 2015, p. 14) 
 
4 What are CoCo bonds and how do they work? 
CoCo’s, contingent convertibles, can be seen as an evolvement from normal hybrid secu-
rities. When issued, they have all the normal characteristics of a straight bond. The regu-
latory relevance of the paper is gained through a mandatory conversion mechanism. Pre-
defined trigger levels are incorporated, exposing the bondholders to potential capital 
write-down or equity conversion during economic distress of the bank. Designed to ab-
sorb capital losses in banks capital, CoCo bonds are deemed bail-in instruments, helping 
to prevent banks from going bankrupt. Furthermore, they are classified as going-concern 
capital, helping the bank in case of financial distress and not only once bankruptcy is 
announced. Today’s CoCo triggers are mainly linked to CET1 ratios.  
 
4.1 Distinction from standard hybrids 
A long-known asset class are the hybrids, on a bank and corporate level. Although some 
similarities between CoCo bonds and hybrid bonds do exist, the main differences and 
similarities will be outlined in the following. 
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Even though hybrids are subordinated papers, they are not considered going-concern but 
rather gone-concern, meaning they are not suitable to absorb losses during distress on the 
capital side. However, once a bank faces bankruptcy, hybrids will be subordinated to 
normal debt and are therefore useful gone-concern capital for creditors. In addition, dur-
ing no time in the life of a hybrid paper, any kind of conversion or write-down can take 
place, meaning capital will remain on the balance sheet as debt. A similarity among both 
security types is the ability to defer coupon payments. In both cases, coupon payments 
can be suspended for undefined time periods. Some hybrid papers are fully congruent 
with CoCo bonds when it comes to coupon payment. The non-cumulative feature allows 
issuers to skip coupon payments at their discretion, not having to recover skipped pay-
ments at any point later in time, even when coupons are paid again. Also, some hybrids, 
mirroring CoCo’s, have a dividend stopper clause implemented. This clause prohibits is-
suers from paying out any form of dividend when coupon payments are stopped on bonds. 
 
4.2 Distinction from standard convertible bonds  
Convertible bonds are the second structure that needs some clarification. Similar to 
straight bonds and contrary to CoCo bonds, standard convertible bonds have been in-
vented a long tone time ago. Although similar naming of both security types suggests 
similarities in the design, this is not really the case.  
Convertible bonds get issued as a straight bond, with an embedded call option on the 
shares of the company. Trading behaviour in the secondary market is very much depended 
on the share price. If the call option is far out of the money, the product trades as normal 
straight bond. If the call option is deep in the money, standard convertible bonds are 
traded very closely to equity or a high delta call option. Once trading just around the strike 
price, this product is a unique asset class in itself. There is no special going- or gone-
concern feature attached to the product. Furthermore, the right to convert the bond into 
equity lays at the sole discretion of the bondholder, not the issuer. During the last couple 
of years, the product has lost its attractiveness for issuers, contrary to CoCo bonds. This 
is mainly due to the very low interest rate-environment, making it superfluous for com-
panies to use the covered call strategy to lower their borrowing cost. 
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4.3 Trigger type 
The trigger type describes the point at which conversion or write-down takes place. Sev-
eral types have been proposed based on either accounting figures, market levels or regu-
lators discretion. Below, the most common ones are outlined. 
 
4.3.1 Regulatory trigger (PONV) 
The point of a non-viability trigger (PONV) is mostly implemented together with an ac-
counting or market-based trigger. It gives the national regulator the discretionary right to 
trigger conversion or write-down in case the bank becomes non-viable. FINMA, the 
Swiss regulator, will activate the PONV-trigger when either “a bankruptcy can be 
avoided” or before “assistance from the public sector is needed” (Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (FINMA), 2013, p. 11): The Basel III accord decided to make 
PONV-triggers mandatory for all new issues of CoCo bonds, otherwise classification as 
tier 1 capital is not granted. All instruments issued after the first of January 2013 have 
PONV-triggers implemented, regardless of any other trigger mechanism applied in addi-
tion (Bank for International Settlements, 2011, p. 4). 
 
4.3.2 Accounting trigger 
Accounting triggers are, combined with PONV-triggers, the most commonly used trig-
gers in today’s CoCo bond market. Basel III is mainly focused on the CET1 as a trigger 
level, as it is also seen as the key health indicator for banks by the committee (De 
Spiegeleer, Schoutens, & Van Hulle, 2014, p. 84). When setting trigger levels, two main 
standards have evolved. Low triggers, ranging from 5%-5.125% CET1 ratio and so-called 
high triggers, ranging from 7-7.125% CET1 ratio. The predefined levels mark the point 
at which the bond automatically gets converted or written-down. During the last couple 
of years, the market has evolved towards high-level triggers, making it almost standard 
to have 7%-7-7.125% triggers. Some regulators decided to fully shift towards high-level 
CoCo’s and are not allowing any low trigger bonds to be considered as tier 1. Switzerland 
decided that only high trigger CoCo’s are eligible in addition to the already stricter capital 
rules (Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement, 2016, p. 4).  
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4.3.3 Market-based trigger 
Market-based triggers such as CDS levels or share prices are proposed by various papers, 
as outlined in the literature review. A certain predefined level of the market traded product 
would be set as the trigger, nevertheless this kind of trigger was never enforced. Basel III 
has no focus at all on market-based triggers and focuses solely on capital levels. One of 
the main reasons could be the possibility of market manipulation by certain participants 
(De Spiegeleer, Schoutens, & Van Hulle, 2014, p. 85).  
 
4.3.4 Systemic trigger 
Systemic triggers focus on the general health of the sector or the economy. The conver-
sion mechanism could be linked to representative health indicators. Some propose to have 
certain moving averages of bank equity indices as a trigger (McDonald, 2013, p. 4). An-
other possibility could be the iTraxx CDS index for senior or subordinated bonds, reflect-
ing the financials industries average credit spread. However, like the market-based trig-
ger, systemic triggers were not implemented. One can say that disadvantages overweigh. 
The trigger is not linked to the specific capital cushion of the bank and therefore erases 
incentives for the management to enhance the capital base. Also, the lack in differentia-
tion could cause banks to write down or convert bonds which are not in trouble at all, 
only because the industry as a whole faces difficulties (Pazarbasioglu, Moor, Zhou, & Le 
Leslé, 2011, p. 25).  
 
4.4 Loss absorption mechanism 
The loss absorption mechanism describes the way the bonds get treated after the respec-
tive trigger level is reached or the regulator triggers via a regulatory trigger. In general, 
two main ways of loss absorption can be observed: Equity conversion and principal write-
down. Both mechanisms will be outlined below. 
 
4.4.1 Equity conversion 
The equity conversion leads to a shift from debt to equity and is therefore dilutive for 
existing equity holders (De Spiegeleer, Schoutens, & Van Hulle, 2014, p. 2). The shift 
from debt to equity does not bring any fresh liquidity to the balance sheet but immediately 
improves the quality from the capital held. Equity conversion incentivises equity holders 
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to put pressure on the management to avoid a trigger event, in order to avoid dilution of 
the equity. The degree of dilution is dependent on the way the share price, at which a 
bondholder receives them, is calculated. One can identify two types of conversion ac-
cepted by regulators and applied in the market; both are outlined below.  
 
When the fixed conversion is applied, the conversion price is known from the beginning. 
Some issues fix a nominal price when issuing directly (De Spiegeleer, Schoutens, & Van 
Hulle, 2014, p. 80). In some cases, the conversion price is set as a fraction of the price at 
issuance, logically implying a lower price at conversion (De Spiegeleer, Marquet, & 
Schoutens, 2019). 
 
When speaking of floating conversion prices, fully floatable prices would theoretically 
be possible but have never been applied. This has mainly to do with the absence of loss 
absorption if the conversion would take place at the market level, undermining the use of 
CoCo’s and transferring the complete loss to equity holders (De Spiegeleer, Schoutens, 
& Van Hulle, 2014, p. 80). To avoid this scenario, a floor is set. Even if the stock price 
drifts lower than this level, conversion takes place at the floor level, ensuring a loss ab-
sorption by bondholders.  
 
4.4.2 Principal full write-down 
The principal full write-down is a possible design of the second loss absorption mecha-
nism applied in the market. This mechanism is especially important to banks that do not 
issue shares, such as Raiffeisen and ZKB in Switzerland or Rabobank in the Netherlands. 
Once the trigger event is met, the complete capital is subsequently written off, causing 
bondholders to lose their complete capital.  
 
4.4.3 Principal partial write-down 
Partial write-down mechanisms write down a predefined part of the issue immediately, 
the remaining nominal amount gets thereafter returned to bondholders (Cesaroni, 2017, 
p. 7). Rabobank issued a partial write-down bond in 2010, calling it a Senior Contingent 
Note. The paper had a trigger set at 7% CET1, writing down 75% of the nominal imme-
diately after the threshold would have been reached. The remaining capital would subse-
quently be returned to investors (Buergi, 2013, p. 39).  
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4.4.4 Principal staggered write-down 
Staggered write-down features are more flexible compared to full write-downs 
(Choudhry, Moskovic, & Wong, 2014, p. 202). They can be seen as a mix between a full 
write-down and a partial write-down. Here, once the trigger level is reached, the bond is 
not immediately written down in full but has various write-down levels. An example of 
this is the 2012-issued ZKB CoCo bond. When the CET1 level would fall below 7%, the 
bond would be written-down by 25%, 50%, 75% or 99.98%. The final decision on how 
much will be written down lies with the Swiss regulator FINMA with the main intention 
being to re-establish the target CET1 level (Buergi, 2013, p. 42). 
 
4.4.5 Market take on different mechanisms and a short history  
At first, write-down seems to be the far worse option for bondholders and should be re-
warded with higher yields for bonds with the write-down feature implemented. This base-
case scenario was correct for some time and can also be easily observed in historical 
market spreads. The theory got shattered in summer of 2014, when Portuguese lender 
Banco Espírito Santo got into heavy financial distress. The situation was resolved by a 
split in to a “bad-“ and a “good-bank”, taking good assets and credits into the “good-
bank” – Novo Banco. All bad assets, including NPLs and subordinated debt, were put 
into the “bad-bank” and let go bankrupt. A second example is Santander’s takeover of 
troubled Banco Popular. All CET1 and tier 1 was written-off, tier 2 was converted into 
shares worth 1 EUR in total.  
Both cases are seen as a precedent for the market, slowly erasing differences between a 
write-off and equity conversion, as the financial outcome for CoCo holders is indifferent 
when accepting equity of the bankrupt “bad bank”. In table 5 below, two bonds were 
chosen to illustrate the tiny difference that loss absorption mechanisms are making to the 
YTC: 
 
Ticker Coupon Next Call Maturity CET1 
Trigger 
level 
Loss absorp-
tion mecha-
nism 
Current 
YTC 
SHBASS $ 6.25% 01.03.2024 Perp 5.125% Equity con-
version 
5.96% 
SHBASS $ 5.25% 01.03.2021 Perp 5.125% Write-down 5.617% 
Table 5: Econometrics for comparable Svenska Handelsbanken (Bloomberg L.P., 2018) 
CoCo Bonds - What drives their yields compared to benchmarks and on a standalone basis?
   
 
- 22 - 
Looking at the historical yields and the spread below, one can observe that the SHBASS 
6.25% with the equity conversion feature yields 34bps more than the SHBASS 5.25% 
with the write-down feature. This can mostly be explained by the call date, standing at 
2024 for the SHBASS 6.25% and at 2021 for the SHBASS 5.25%, giving the SHBASS a 
duration of roughly 2.5 years more. Interpolating the curve, we can derive a rough pre-
mium of 30-40bps for the extension from two years to five years on the yield curve 
(Bloomberg L.P., 2018). The predominant part of the difference in yield can therefore 
already be explained by the different call dates. Analyzing below historical spread, it can 
be observed that both, premiums and discounts, can exist during different times. This can 
mainly be explained by the episodic investor preference for one or the other bond and the 
associated excess of supply or demand in the relevant paper. In conclusion, the yield dif-
ference related to the loss absorption mechanism is converging towards zero. Even though 
it is very hard to find a case to compare one-to-one without interpolating, figure 4 shows 
the exemplary lack of a premium for write-down bonds: 
 
 
Figure 4: Historical spread SHBASS 6.25 PERP vs. SHBASS 5.25 PERP (Bloomberg L.P.) 
 
4.5 Callability and Step-up 
Newly issued CoCo bonds need to be non-callable for at least five years (De Spiegeleer, 
Marquet, & Schoutens, 2019, p. 7). Also, no incentive to call the paper shall be made. 
This would normally happen through a coupon step-up, offering a higher coupon to in-
vestors after the mandatory five-year non-call period. This contradicts the use of CoCo 
bonds and also increases debt servicing cost if no refinancing can be made on the market 
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during market distress, which is normally the case when CoCo’s come into action (De 
Spiegeleer, Schoutens, & Van Hulle, 2014, p. 10). 
 
4.6 Coupon payments 
To improve flexibility, the bank needs to have full discretion when paying out coupons, 
meaning a discretional coupon cancellation can be exercised by the bank. Those missed 
payments do not trigger a default on either the CoCo or any other bond. In addition, 
missed coupons are non-cumulative, meaning no missed payments need to be recovered 
at a later point in time. Other payments can be made from cash that was not paid out as a 
coupon, except dividend payments. For dividends, a dividend-stopper is applied, prohib-
iting dividend payment to shareholders when no coupons are paid (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2011, p. 16). However, the European Union decided to implement 
different rules when it comes to dividend-stopper clauses. These features are fully forbid-
den for European banks (European Union, 2013, p. 49). Contrary, Switzerland decided to 
follow the Basel committee and has not banned dividend-stoppers (Oster, 2018, p. 35). 
The solution of the EU can be seen as a wealth transfer from bondholders to equity hold-
ers, but not deriving from an equity conversion point of view (Roggi, Giannozzi, & 
Mibelli, 2013, S. 4). The wealth transfer occurs as no dividend-stopper is implemented, 
making it possible not to service the debt while paying out dividends, changing the stand-
ard order known. Hence, a coupon deferral could be agreed on the perpetual bond while 
still paying out dividends to the equity holder (Oster, 2018, p. 21). 
Also, CoCo coupons have to be paid out of the ADI (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2011, p. 16). The ADI are defined as “the amount of the profits at the end of 
the latest financial year plus any profits brought forward and reserves available” by the 
CRR (European Banking Authority (EBA), 2009).  
 
5 Quantitative Part 
This quantitative part should enable readers to get inside the market movements of CoCo 
bonds and the relevant drivers. As the CoCo bonds issuance size only gained market 
relevance in 2014, there have been few historical evaluations of the drivers due to the 
short time frame. This paper uses over 3.5 market years to quantify the impact certain 
factors have on the yield of CoCo bonds. The whole analysis should lead to an improved 
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understanding of the CoCo bond market and should enhance the investors understanding 
when accessing market moves in relevant securities.  
 
5.1 Bond data description 
The examined securities had to fulfil specific parameters to be included in the sample 
group of bonds. The final group contains 14 bonds, which were issued by five different 
banks. All the market data was extracted between 30.09.2015 and 05.04.2019. For the 
relevant bonds, the daily closing prices and yields were extracted from Bloomberg. The 
fixed income search criteria applied in Bloomberg will systematically be outlined and 
their relevance shall be explained. All related bonds will thereafter be displayed in table 
6 below. 
 
5.1.1 Capital Type limitation 
The capital type was set to contingent convertible, filtering out every bond classified as 
CoCo by Bloomberg. Here, bonds not qualified as CoCo bond under Basel III are in-
cluded as well and hence more precise factors were subsequently added.  
 
5.1.2 Basel designation limitation 
As revealed in the regulatory context part, regulations were and still are changing con-
stantly. Certain papers are already grandfathered and do not count as AT1 capital anymore 
but are still trading in the secondary market. To avoid bonds with no regulatory relevance 
in the sampling group, only papers with Basel III designation AT1 were allowed. 
 
5.1.3 CET1 trigger limitation 
The minimum CET1 trigger was set to 7%. This criterium improves comparability be-
tween all selected bonds, as all have a trigger level of 7% except for one standing at 8%. 
Also, those high trigger bonds satisfy even those regulatory requirements tougher than 
Basel III, as we can observe in Switzerland (Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement, 2016, 
p. 4). This trigger requirement in the statistic makes sure the bonds can also be examined 
in another statistical evaluation at a later point in time, as they are completely compliant 
or overcompliant with contemporary rules.  
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5.1.4 Outstanding Amount limitation 
The minimum amount outstanding for each bond was set at a minimum of 200mio in the 
issued currency. This ensures no real private placement will be in the sample list, as small 
issues get placed with big shareholders or single investors from time to time. These issues 
can sometimes have different conditions than they would normally have if being priced 
in the market, thus distorting the analysis. In addition, solely privately placed bonds usu-
ally do not have a secondary market, making it impossible to extract any price data needed 
to conduct an analysis.  
 
5.1.5 Maturity type limitation 
According to Basel III rules, issued CoCo bonds need to be perpetual in order to qualify 
as AT1 capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011, p. 15). To ensure com-
parability, only perpetual instruments were taken into account when constructing the sam-
ple group.  
 
5.1.6 Tranche 144a limitation 
Securities sold in the U.S. need to be registered with the SEC. The exemption rule to sell 
securities without registration is the so-called rule 144a, making it possible to sell the 
products under certain conditions but without registration (United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2013). Bond tranches falling under the 144a rule were excluded 
from the list, as their inclusion would have triggered several double listings. Most bonds 
are issued under two different ISINs, one eligible to sell to the U.S. under the 144a rule 
and one for distribution to the rest of the world. Both tranches have the same economet-
rics, the difference lies solely in the regulatory context. 
 
5.1.7 Currency limitation 
The bond list was limited to bonds issued in CHF, EUR, GBP or USD. The main objection 
is to eliminate bonds issued in rather exotic currencies for bonds such as NOK, IDR or 
CNY, as the comparability between those currencies seems to be very low. Furthermore, 
the CoCo market is globally concentrated in hard currencies, whereas the above-men-
tioned currencies are the exception, as marketability to investors is lower. Even though 
the criteria would have allowed bonds denominated in CHF, only bonds in EUR, GBP 
and USD matched all relevant criteria.  
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5.1.8 Country limitation 
Bonds from the following risk countries were excluded deliberately from the list: China, 
Russia, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. All these countries do have outstanding bonds 
matching with the CoCo definition of Bloomberg. Nevertheless, those countries do have 
substantially different regulatory standards than the ones examined in the regulatory part 
of this paper and are therefore not comparable (Goncharenko, Ongena, & Rauf, 2017, p. 
4).  
 
5.1.9 Issue Date limitation 
Bonds included in the sampling group had to be issued not later than on the 01.01.2015. 
This ensures that the bonds are outstanding for more than 3.5 years, making it possible to 
extract pricing data for a longer time frame. In consequence, recently issued bonds were 
excluded, as the statistical significance is too low when observing only a short period of 
time. As this is one of the first papers being able to examine longer-term effects and cor-
relations for CoCo bonds, this is one of the most important limitations.  
 
5.1.10 Industry limitation 
Certain insurance companies are issuing bonds similar to CoCo bonds. Swiss Re, for ex-
ample, issued a CoCo bond in 2013 that is maturing in 2024. This bond, similar to a CoCo 
bond issued by a bank, has a 100% write-down feature linked to the SST (Erismann, 2015, 
p. 6). This ratio is designed to ensure the proper capitalization of an insurance company 
in Switzerland, similar to the CET1 used for banks (Swiss Financial Market Supervisory 
Authority (FINMA), 2018). Here, different regulatory standards apply, hence compara-
bility is given neither for the design of the security nor for the general regulatory standard 
applied for the industry. Therefore, all other industries, except traditional banks, are ex-
cluded from the sample list.  
 
5.1.11 Coupon type limitation 
When comparing bond coupons, the main distinction is made between fixed coupons and 
floating coupons. Today’s CoCo bonds are mostly issued with a fixed-to-floating type 
coupon. The coupon is fixed for the first five years, equivalent to the minimum non-
callability requirement of the Basel III accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
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2011, p. 16). If the bond is not called, the coupon gets floating above a predefined bench-
mark, plus a certain spread. Bonds with a coupon that is completely floating from the 
issuance on were excluded. This would otherwise undermine the regression analysis, as 
they are barely sensitive to changes in interest rates. Thus, they would behave differently 
than fixed-to-floating bonds and yield different results when conducting the regression 
analysis.  
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Issuer Name Coupon Maturity 
Next Call 
Date Currency 
Amount 
Outstand-
ing in bn. 
CoCo 
Trigger 
Basel III 
Designation 
Loss absorption mecha-
nism 
Barclays PLC 6.625 Perp 15.09.2019 USD 1.211 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Barclays PLC 8 Perp 15.12.2020 EUR 1.377 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Barclays PLC 6.5 Perp 15.09.2019 EUR 1.458 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Barclays PLC 7 Perp 15.09.2019 GBP 1.183 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Danske Bank A/S 5.75 Perp 04.06.2020 EUR 1.043 7 Additional Tier 1 Temporary Write-down 
HSBC Holdings PLC 6.375 Perp 17.09.2014 USD 2.25 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
HSBC Holdings PLC 5.625 Perp 17.01.2020 USD 1.5 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
HSBC Holdings PLC 5.25 Perp 16.09.2022 EUR 1.943 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 7.5 Perp 27.06.2024 USD 1.675 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 7.625 Perp 27.06.2023 GBP 2.487 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 6.375 Perp 27.06.2020 EUR 1.035 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 7 Perp 27.06.2019 GBP 2.465 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 7.875 Perp 27.06.2029 GBP 1.248 7 Additional Tier 1 Equity Conversion 
Nordea Bank Abp 6.125 Perp 23.09.2024 USD 0.5 8 Additional Tier 1 Temporary Write-down 
Table 6: Complete CoCo bond sample group (Bloomberg L.P., 2019) 
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5.2 Additional Data 
To perform the regression and multiple regression analysis, a data set of various indicators 
that could influence bond yields was collected. Some of them are directly linked to the 
company issuing the CoCo bond or the bond itself, others can be seen as leading indica-
tors for the whole economy. Mirroring bond yields, daily closing prices of every indicator 
were downloaded from Bloomberg. The observation period, congruent to the bond data 
set, is set between 30.09.2015 and 05.04.2019. In addition, two indices were added to 
benchmark the sensitivity of CoCo bonds and have an anchor point when interpreting. 
Every indicator will be explained, and the relevancy defined.  
 
5.2.1 Relevant interest rate 
The relevant interest rate depends on the currency the bond is issued in. Three different 
benchmarks were identified consequently and linked to the currency of the bond. The 
constant five-year government bond yield of Great Britain, the United States and Ger-
many, symbolising the euro curve, were chosen. The five-year time to maturity is over-
lapping with the mostly five-year non-callability of CoCo bonds at issuance. Normal rate 
sensitivity that straight bonds evince will be examined on CoCo bonds.  
 
5.2.2 Equity Price 
The daily equity closing price of every issuer was extracted. The main objective is to 
capture the interdependence of single equity prices and bond returns if there is any. These 
two instruments seem to be very closely linked in case of financial distress and hence it 
seems to be appropriate to analyse their correlation.  
 
5.2.3 Fully loaded CET1 ratio 
The fully loaded CET1 ratio of each day was extracted for each bond. The fully loaded 
CET1 ratio, contrary to the phased-in CET1 ratio, is calculated as if all transitional rules 
regarding CET1 capital were already expired (Pfingsten, 2016, p. 18). After calculating 
the distance to the trigger, the effects of changing CET1 ratios on bond yields shall be 
examined. 
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5.2.4 Equity indices 
Three different equity indices were included in the analysis. The EURO STOXX 50 was 
included as one of the leading European stock indices currently available. It captures 50 
blue-chip stocks leading their sector which are located in the Eurozone (Bloomberg L.P., 
2019). This index can be seen as an indicator of the whole equity market in Europe. 
The EURO STOXX banks index was the second one included in to the analysis. This 
sector-specific composite captures the 26 banks operating in the Eurozone with the high-
est market value (Bloomberg L.P., 2019). This index is used to measure the performance 
of the whole banking equity market. 
The third included index is the EURO STOXX 50 ex Financials. Similar to the EURO 
STOXX 50, this composite captures 50 super sectoral leaders in the Eurozone, except 
firms that are active in the financial sector. This index excludes isolated banking issues 
from the performance and therefore captures all the rest of the equity markets in Europe. 
 
5.2.5 USD interest rate curve shape 
To quantify the curve shape of the USD interest rate market, the daily spread between the 
three-month on the run U.S. Treasury bill and the ten-year on the run U.S. Treasury note 
was extracted. A negative number implies an inverted yield curve when looking at the 
three-month and the ten-year points. The shape of the curve is often used as a leading 
indicator to foresee the macro-economic developments, as an inverted curve is usually 
seen as a sign for an economic recession. In addition, a steep yield curve is also seen as 
favourable for bank revenues (Borio, Hofmann, & Gambacorta, 2015, S. 17). Banks tend 
to finance lending and trading operations at the very short end of the yield curve and 
invest at the longer end of the curve, ignoring the principle of matching maturities. Once 
the yield curve gets flatter the gains shrink, turning into a loss when inversion is reached.  
 
5.2.6 U.S. GDP growth 
The GDP growth in the U.S. on a quarter on quarter was extracted. This is another indi-
cator from which conclusions regarding the health of the economy as a whole can be 
drawn. The U.S. is the biggest economy in the world and, therefore, the U.S. GDP can be 
seen as a global barometer for growth.  
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5.2.7 CDS global index 
To measure the global credit market, a tailor-made CDS index was constructed and daily 
closing prices extracted. It was deliberately decided not to use a CDS index focused on 
the banking sector, as the correlations would consequently be large. Instead, the created 
index symbolises the western CDS markets. It consists to 50% of the Markit CDX North 
America Investment grade index, which is an index itself, combining 125 five-year single 
CDS distributed among various industry sectors (Bloomberg L.P., 2019). The remaining 
50% consist of the European counterpart, the Itraxx Europe. The composition is again 
split between 125 different five-year CDS of firms operating in various sectors 
(Bloomberg L.P., 2019). 
 
5.2.8 Barclays Bloomberg corporate excl. financials price index 
To benchmark sensitivity of CoCo bonds towards certain factors, the Barclays Bloomberg 
corporate index was included. Rate sensitivity or correlation with global CDS markets 
can be compared amongst other factors. The index includes corporate bonds denominated 
in EUR and issued by European blue-chips. Financial institutions are excluded deliber-
ately to avoid multicollinearity (Bloomberg L.P., 2019). 
 
5.2.9 Barclays Bloomberg senior financial institutions price index 
To benchmark the sensitivity that CoCo bonds have towards certain factors compared to 
their senior bond peers, the Barclays Bloomberg senior financial institution index was 
included. The index contains senior bonds denominated in EUR issued by various finan-
cial institutions (Bloomberg L.P., 2019). 
 
5.2.10 Barclays Bloomberg European Banks CoCo tier 1 total return index  
To analyse the historical correlation of European CoCo bonds, the Barclays Bloomberg 
European Banks CoCo tier 1 total return index was selected as the benchmark. The index 
includes 135 CoCo bonds denominated in EUR, issued by European banks (Bloomberg 
L.P., 2019) 
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5.3 Methodology  
5.3.1 Single regression analysis 
At first, an OLS single regression analysis was run for every single independent variable. 
This was necessary to determine the significance level of each variable on a single basis. 
In order to avoid too much multicollinearity, the !" is analysed separately for every in-
dependent variable. This is important to determine the amount of variance that can be 
explained by every single variable, as some independent variables were expected to move 
together with others at a high correlation level. The denotation for every single regression 
OLS is the following:  
 #$% = '( + '*+* + +,- 
 
The variables are named as follows: 
 #.-: Depended variable (daily bond yield) '(: Constant intercept term '*: Regression coefficient +*: Independent variable ,-: Error term 
 
5.3.2 Correlation matrix / Single correlation 
To understand the correlations and the existing multicollinearity, a correlation matrix was 
extracted. It helped to understand where multicollinearity comes from. The goal was to 
exclude variables from the multiple regression analysis who are highly correlated with 
others, as it would not help the reliability and accuracy of the model. In addition, a his-
torical correlation analysis was run for a single bond and a CoCo index. The analysis 
helps to see if any changes in correlation are identified in the last 1.5 years.  
 
5.3.3 Multiple regression analysis 
To establish a relationship between daily bond yields and the factors found relevant in the 
single regression analysis above, a multiple regression model was built, based on OLS. 
The multiple regression analysis is based on the formula below: 
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#$% = '( + '*+* + '"+" + '0+0 + '1+1 + '2+2 + '3+3 + '4+4 + '5+5 + ,- 
 
The observation of the depended variable, here the daily bond yield, is denoted as #.-. The 
constant intercept term is denoted as '(, independent variables are written as +*	78	+5, 
symbolising the eight factors applied later in the multiple regression.  
The regression coefficient of each relevant independent variable is denoted as '* to '5, 
as eight different variables factor into the multiple regression analysis. Residuals, also 
known as random errors, are denoted as ,-.  
P-values are evaluated and tested on their significance level. Also, the coefficients for 
every independent variable were assessed. How much of the variance in the bond yield 
can be explained by the independent variables was explained and assessed based on the !".  
 
5.3.4 Distance to trigger 
The distance to the trigger was initially calculated by simply subtracting the CET1 trigger 
level from the fully loaded CET1 ratio published by the company. This implies a linear 
dependence between the distance to trigger and the bond yield, which would be a very 
theoretical approach. For good reason, this is not the case, as it would imply a change 
very close to the trigger level, threatening to convert or write off the bond, would have 
the same impact on yields as a change in trigger distance far away from the trigger. The 
effect can be observed when checking DIP options, as their sensitivity to underlying 
changes increases drastically when approaching the barrier.  
To abate the linearity, the distance to trigger was squared first, which would turn the 
relationship between yield and distance to trigger into a positive term, which is wrong. 
The first step already helped to move away from full linearity. In consequence, the term 
was raised by the power of three, turning it back into a positive term. The formula created 
consequently is denoted the following:  
 #$% = '( + '*+ + '"+" + '0+0 
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#$%  represents the observation of the depended variable, here the yield of the bond. '*to '0 
stand for each coefficient determined by the regression analysis for each distance to trig-
ger, depending on the power it was raised by. '9 is defined as the intercept. X is the 
denotation for the relevant distance to trigger. The linear model is denoted the following: 
 #$% = '( + '*+ 
 
All dependent and independent variables are equivalent to the binominal approach.  
 
5.3.5 Assumptions 
When building the model, the normal distribution of the error term will be assumed. Also, 
no autocorrelation is assumed, hence error terms of different observations should not be 
correlated. Heteroscedastic errors are also not presumed within the model (The Albert.io 
Team, 2016).  
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Single regression analysis 
The single regression results will be outlined in table 7 below. The relevant factors dis-
played are the coefficient, p-value, !" and the statistical significance. The significance is 
symbolized by asterisks. A p-value below 10% generates one asterisk, a p-value below 
5% two and a high significance is given when the p-value is lower than 1% and is valued 
with three asterisks. 
 
Independent 
variable  
Coefficient p-value (scien-
tific notation) 
:; Significance 
Interest rate 0.421553 1.44e-150 0.051771 *** 
Equity price −0.00126959 4.75e-61 0.020925 *** 
Distance to 
trigger 
−0.443485 0.0000 0.131239 *** 
EURO 
STOXX banks 
−0.0577174 0.0000 0.256689 *** 
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EURO 
STOXX non-
banks 
−0.0119009 0.0000 0.464006 *** 
EURO 
STOXX 50 
−0.00575055 0.0000 0.469398 *** 
US 3m vs. 10yr 
spread 
0.00862367 5.18e-138 0.047500 *** 
US GDP QoQ −0.811828 0.0000 0.150465 *** 
CDS global in-
dex 
0.0950365 0.0000 0.413402 *** 
Table 7: Single regression analysis results 
 
All regressors are highly significant when performing a single regression. The results will 
be further discussed in the interpretation section. 
 
5.4.2 Correlation matrix / Single correlation 
Some variables are strongly correlated with each other, raising the issue of multicolline-
arity. To avoid this, a correlation matrix was built which is displayed below as figure 5. 
In addition, the detailed correlation matrix with the exact numbers can be found in the 
attachment in figure 12. 
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Figure 5: Correlation matrix 
 
The main observation is the logical one, as the three equity indices are highly correlated. 
Therefore, it was determined to eliminate the EURO STOXX 50 fully from the multiple 
regression analysis. This due to the fact that generated !" is almost the same as for the 
non-bank index, hence not offering any additional data. Also, one can argue that the non-
bank index combined with the isolated bank index is equaling the total EURO STOXX 
50. In addition, high correlation can be observed between the US GDP QoQ and two 
variables, the US Treasury curve and the CDS global Index. No action will be taken, as 
each of the variables represents another part of the economy and is therefore deemed 
necessary for the analysis.  
 
The single correlation analysis between the benchmark CoCo index and the EURO 
STOXX banks equity index showed a trend towards lower correlation. Below, the devel-
opment of the correlation coefficient over the last 1.5 years can be seen in figure 6: 
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Figure 6: Historical correlation between CoCo index and EURO STOXX banks (Bloomberg L.P., 
2019) 
 
The correlation was standing at a high 60% to 65% between April 2017 and June 2018, 
not showing any significant changes during this time period. However, at the end of June 
2018, an abrupt loss of correlation can be noticed. After the correlation coefficient de-
creased to 40% to 45%, a steady drift towards lower values can be observed. Evaluating 
the last six months, correlation coefficients of 35% and lower are prevalent.  
The same phenomena can be detected when evaluating historical correlation coefficients 
of single CoCo bonds and the equity of the same bank. HSBC was picked as an example. 
The historical correlation over the last 1.5 years is displayed below in figure 7: 
 
Figure 7: Historical correlation between HSBC equity and HSBC CoCo bond (Bloomberg L.P., 2019) 
 
Here, the first drop in correlation can be detected already in February 2018. Further, the 
abrupt drop in correlation observed above for the CoCo index and the EURO STOXX 
banks can also be observed for HSBC. Since the last drop, correlation is remaining at 
levels between 22% and 30%. 
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5.4.3 Multiple regression analysis  
For the multiple regression, eight independent variables were put in as regressors to ex-
plain the change in yield over time. Table 8 below shows the OLS results generated for 
the coefficients, p-values and the total !". 
 
Independent vari-
able 
Coefficient p-value (scientific 
notation) 
Significance 
Interest rate 0.752140 0 *** 
Equity price −0.00124323 6.93e-170 *** 
Distance to trigger −0.258233 6.39e-303 *** 
EURO STOXX 
banks 
−0.0441627 5.16e-294 *** 
EURO STOXX 
non-banks 
−0.00383137 8.67e-89 *** 
US 3m vs. 10yr 
spread 
0.00876245 3.37e-145 *** 
US GDP QoQ −0.127875 1.09e-15 *** 
CDS global index 0.0192846 3.08e-48 *** <=>?@	:; 0.690920 
Table 8: Multiple regression analysis results 
 
Also, in the multiple regression analysis, all inputted factors are highly significant within 
the model. Almost 70% of the variance can be explained by the model.  
To check if multicollinearity was decreased by excluding the EURO STOXX 50 from the 
regression, a test was run, as shown in figure 8 below: 
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Figure 8: Multicollinearity test without EURO STOXX 50 
 
The test showed that no or few multicollinearities were detected within the model. The 
check was performed again with the EURO STOXX 50 included in the multiple regres-
sion model. The result is displayed below in figure 9: 
 
 
Figure 9: Multicollinearity test with EURO STOXX 50 
 
As expected, without the exclusion of the EURO STOXX 50, a massive multicollinearity 
was detected between the three equity indices.  
 
An additional problem called omitted variable bias was not taken in to consideration. Due 
to this fact it might be possible that other regressors might be overestimated, as the EURO 
STOXX 50 was excluded. The EURO STOXX 50 showed high statistically relevant num-
bers in the single regression analysis, making it almost certain that an overestimation of 
other regressors will occur. However, the minimized multicollinearity is seen as a highly 
positive effect, achieved only when leaving out EURO STOXX 50. 
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To quantify the contribution each variable makes to the !", each model was run omitting 
one variable. In table 9 below, the increase in precision made by each variable is outlined:  
 
Independent variable Contribution nominal / percentage of	A; 
Interest Rate 0.149408 / 21.62% 
Equity Price 0.019147 / 2.77% 
EURO STOXX banks 0.034072 / 4.93% 
EURO STOXX non-banks 0.009756 / 1.41% 
US 3m vs. 10yr 0.016259 / 2.35% 
US GDP QoQ 0.001551 / 0.22% 
CDS global index 0.005169 / 0.75% 
Distance to trigger 0.035169 / 5.09% 
EURO STOXX banks and non-banks 
combined 
0.112508 / 16.28% 
EURO STOXX banks, non-banks and 
CDS global index 
0.323551 / 46.83% 
<=>?@	A; of the multi regression:  0.690920 
Table 9: Contribution to variance explanation multiple regression yield 
 
5.4.4 Benchmarking 
In order to have data to compare the output coefficient, p-values and !" additional to the 
multiple and single regression, a separate model was run. Two indices were selected sym-
bolising the corporate bond market without banks and the senior bank bond market re-
spectively. Important to know is the fact that both indices are price-based. Thus, the co-
efficients have the opposite sign compared to the bond analysis, as that is based on yields. 
Equity price and distance to the trigger was not regressed in this case, as it would not 
make sense to regress those variables against an index. The output for the single regres-
sion analysis can be seen in table 10 below. Also, table 12 and figures 17 and 18 in the 
attachment show the multiple regressions for both indices and the contribution made to 
the !" by each regressor. 
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Independ-
ent variable  
Coefficient p-value (scien-
tific notation) 
:; Signifi-
cance 
German 
Bund 
−6.5030 −19.6807 3.80e-
117 
0 0.0404 0.5177 *** *** 
EURO 
STOXX 
banks 
−0.0323 −0.0857 5.85e-
35 
0 0.0118 0.1113 *** *** 
EURO 
STOXX 
non-banks 
0.0261 0.0013 0 0.0002 0.3140 0.0011 *** *** 
EURO 
STOXX 50 
0.0084 −0.0014 0 8.77e-18 0.1399 0.0057 *** *** 
US 3m vs. 
10yr spread 
−0.0746 −0.0083 0 2.97e-26 0.4985 0.0087 *** *** 
US GDP 
QoQ 
4.0324 0.2126 0 3.27e-07 0.5209 0.0020 *** *** 
CDS global 
index 
−0.2823 0.0062 0 0.0366 0.5119 0.0003 *** ** 
BB corporate excl. financials index 
 
Barclays Bloomberg senior financial institu-
tions index 
Table 10: Benchmark single regression analysis 
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6 Interpretation 
6.1 Single regression CoCo bonds 
Generally, the single regression shows that all factors seem to influence the yield of the 
CoCo sample in a statistically significant manner. The explanation of the variance is over 
40% for certain variables, namely EURO STOXX 50, EURO STOXX non-banks and 
CDS global index. With less than 5% each, interest rate, equity price and US 3m vs. 10yr 
have rather low explanation power. Some very small coefficients could easily get under-
estimated, as they relate to a change of one unit of the variable. In consequence, the US 
Treasury curve coefficient looks small at first sight, leaving aside the very small changes 
needed to affect the move. On the other hand, the US GDP coefficient looks fairly sub-
stantial. Nevertheless, a change by one full unit in the GDP is a somewhat bigger event 
than the analogical move in the US Treasury curve. Every output for each variable will 
be interpreted in detail below and compared to the benchmark indices if possible.  
 
6.1.1 Interest Rate 
Unsurprisingly, the interest rate influences CoCo bonds, as every fixed income product 
will have this sensitivity up to a certain degree. The effect is comparatively very low when 
contrasting it with the results generated by both benchmarks. This can be explained by 
the higher risk embodied by CoCo bonds. This makes them more dependent on other 
factors than simple interest rates. On the other hand, normal corporate debt and senior 
bank debt is closer to a pure rates product and hence is way more sensitive to interest rate 
changes. The variance explained by the change in interest rate is fairly small, especially 
compared to the higher notch senior bonds. Corporate bonds also seem to have less over-
all variance explained by the interest rate, maybe pointing towards more company-spe-
cific outlays. Still, interest rates are highly significant for CoCo bonds and both indices.   
 
6.1.2 Equity Price 
The impact of the equity price cannot be evaluated together with the benchmark indices, 
as the indices cannot be assigned to one single share. The coefficient from the single 
regression shows a statistically high significant relationship, linking a higher equity price 
of a bank with lower yields on the CoCo bonds. This makes sense, as higher equity prices 
point towards a better performing company, which can be associated with less credit risk 
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in general. Still interesting is the very low !", which is the lowest among all !"	of every 
regressed variable. It can be stated that the own equity price is not an extensive explainer 
of the variance of the CoCo bonds issued by the same company. The correlation between 
both, equity price and yield, is standing at -0.14 as per figure 13 in the attachment. This 
confirms the negative relation but cannot prove a high influence by one factor on the 
other.  
 
6.1.3 Distance to trigger 
The distance to the trigger was analysed based on a linear relationship. Here, an increase 
in distance by one unit lowers the yield by almost 0.5%. The problem with linearity is 
that it will not hold true in the market environment. A change in the distance by one unit 
at a very close level to the trigger will not have the same impact as a distance change by 
one unit far away from the trigger level. To illustrate the difference between the ap-
proaches described in 5.3.4, both will be displayed based on the outputs in figure 14 and 
15 in the attachment.  
 
 
Figure 10: Distance to trigger linear vs. non-linear 
 
The blue line indicates the linear calculation, the red one the non-linear estimation. It is 
clearly visible that the blue output does not take in to account the proximity to the trigger 
level. The non-linear approach applied in red is a better fit. As soon as the trigger levels 
are approached, the yield increases disproportionally. When moving further away from 
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the trigger level, an additional increase in CET1 ratio does no longer get rewarded with a 
strong change in yield, as the economic significance is not the same. The distance to the 
trigger has to be extended largely after reaching the level of six percentage points differ-
ence to achieve a positive effect on the yield. When trading between a distance to the 
trigger of five to nine, the linear model approximates the non-linear model but is not 
precise when the values are extreme. Still, it can be stated that a clear relationship between 
yield and distance to the trigger can be observed and plotted. The non-linear model based 
on the regression output highlights the importance of the distance to the trigger. 
 
6.1.4 EURO STOXX family 
The EURO STOXX family holds some surprises and is highly correlated among its mem-
bers. Therefore, the results are interpreted together.  
All three equity indices show a negative relationship towards the yield, which can be 
explained by the general dependency on the equity markets of CoCo bonds. Interestingly, 
the !", defining how much of the variance can be explained by the regression, is substan-
tially different. Only 25% of the variance of the CoCo sample can be explained by the 
regressor EURO STOXX banks, which by intuition should have the highest !". On the 
other hand, both EURO STOXX non-banks and EURO STOXX 50 have a substantially 
higher !", standing at 46% each. Also, comparing the correlation coefficient displayed 
in the figure 16 attached, the lowest correlation coefficient can be observed between 
yields and the EURO STOXX banks. This leads to the verdict that CoCo yields are, coun-
terintuitively, stronger impacted by the general market and mirror its systematic risk, ra-
ther than focusing exclusively on the banking sector.  
The benchmark data seems not conclusive. The !" is comparably small, indicating that 
senior banks bonds and corporate bonds do not behave overly similar and do profess a 
more disconnected assets class. When accessing the correlation matrix attached under 
figure 16 in the appendix, this fact gets more obvious. The bond yields correlation coef-
ficient is over 65% in two out of three calculations, still being above 50% in the lowest 
case. Contrary, the correlation coefficients are lower than 40% in five out of six cases. 
This undermines the statement made above, that both included benchmarks behave dif-
ferently than the CoCo market.  
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6.1.5 USD interest rate curve shape 
Both the observed CoCo bonds and the benchmarks have the same reaction toward a 
steeper yield curve, as both react with higher yields or falling cash prices. The mentioned 
impact on the banks’ financing and higher profitability do not impact bonds the way ex-
pected. The market seems not to derive higher profitability of banks when the yield curve 
is steeper, or it just does not regard it as substantial to impact the bond yields. During the 
last three years, a steeper curve meant raising long end yields, as short-term yields were 
consequently raised by the central bank in the U.S., excluding the possibility of a steeper 
curve resulting from falling short term yields. The positive coefficient between CoCo 
bonds and the steepness indicates the pure dependence on the raise of long-term interest 
rates.  
 
6.1.6 U.S. GDP QoQ 
The GDP influences markets and it does influence CoCo bonds. A high !" of 15% can 
explain a serious amount of variance. A full percent point raises in QoQ GDP, which is a 
major economic event, lowers the yields of the observed bonds by 0.8%. This supports 
the information gathered in the interpretation regarding the EURO STOXX family, CoCo 
bonds are affected by macroeconomic indicators. Also, both benchmarks show the same 
outputs. Interestingly, the !"	for the Barclays Bloomberg senior financial institutions 
price index is rather small compared to the index capturing corporates and excluding 
banks.  
 
6.1.7 CDS global index 
The constructed index can explain the second biggest part of the variance in a single re-
gression compared to all other single factors. Also, once again, it gets confirmed that 
CoCo bonds very much react to macro factors. It also seems logical that less of the vari-
ance can be explained as for the Barclays Bloomberg corporate excl. financials index by 
the CDS index, as those bonds’ benchmark CDS are directly included in the CDS index. 
CoCo bonds have a separate market which would be useless to include, as correlation 
would be very close to 100%. Still, CoCo bonds are affected very much by the health of 
the global credit market and not only by idiosyncratic company risk. Complicated to ex-
plain is the very low !"	toward the senior bank index, which is the only p-value with a 
significance level not rated highly significant. 
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6.2 Single correlation 
The single correlation analysis provided some highly interesting results, which lead to 
more questions than answers. The significant drop in correlation observed in June 2018, 
both when analysing the complete market with indices and on single issuer basis, cannot 
be explained by an economic event during this time of the year, as there was none. Since 
the beginning of 2019, the CoCo market saw an incredible rally, compared to a rather 
weak bank equity market. This trend can be seen in both correlation analyses, as the di-
vergence in pure price development seems the most relevant one during the observed time 
period. Still, no impact on the correlation coefficient can be observed. Contrary, in June 
2018, although no different moves in prices can be observed, the correlation still drops 
significantly. Currently, it can be stated that CoCo markets and equity markets have de-
tached for the last six months, compared to the last three years. 
 
6.3 Multiple regression CoCo bonds 
The multiple regression with its eight regressors can explain 69% of the variance of the 
CoCo set. A high 14% is attributed to the change in the interest rate market, which is 
21.65% of the whole explainable variance. This is more than the variance explained by 
interest rates of both benchmark indices. This can partially be explained by the longer 
duration and therefore higher rate sensitivity of CoCo bonds compared to normal bonds. 
CoCo bonds are not callable for the first five years and are generally designed as perpetual 
bonds (De Spiegeleer, Marquet, & Schoutens, 2019, p. 7). The multiple regression shows 
the importance of equity markets for the price movements in CoCo bonds. Together, both 
included EURO STOXX indices are responsible for 16.28% of the explainable variance. 
This value is multiple times bigger than in both benchmarks. For normal corporate bonds, 
the explainable variance by EURO STOXX is standing at 1.01% of the explainable vari-
ance, underlining rather disconnected behaviour of corporate bonds when reviewing 
against equity markets. Senior bank bonds show a slightly higher explainable variance by 
equity markets, standing at 4.76% of the explainable variance. This supports the higher 
market beta of the banking sector, even appearing in normal senior bank debt. On the 
other hand, the CDS explanatory effect is distributed vice versa. Only 0.75% of the CoCo 
explainable variance can be explained by the CDS global index, whereas the benchmarks 
have explaining rates of 13.73% to 15.32%. A reason could be the absence of subordi-
nated single CDS in the composition of the CDS global index. Furthermore, one could 
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mention the completely detached and specialized credit derivatives market for CoCo 
bonds, as there is even an options market existing on cash bonds. This could potentially 
lead to a diluted impact in the explanation in variance from the normal CDS side. An 
important factor is the distance to the trigger, explaining 5.09% of the total 69% explain-
able. This is the second largest value compared to every independent variable, with only 
equity markets topping this value when combined with the interest rate. Even though the 
model used was linear and not approximating perfectly, this still seems an important fac-
tor. Given the fact that the average distance to the trigger is standing at 6.72% and extreme 
values are inexistent, the model still should be able to approximate somewhat correctly. 
A detailed distribution overview of all distances to the trigger can be found in the attach-
ment under figure 19. Both yield curve steepness and U.S. GDP seem to be rather unim-
portant although they are still statistically significant. The GDP shows a negative coeffi-
cient towards the yield, which would imply lower yields when the economy is stronger. 
This makes sense in the short term, which we are looking at here, as 3.5 years should not 
contain several changes in monetary policy within a country. This is a rather long term 
and slow sphere for developed countries, such as the U.S., whose rates we are looking at. 
If we would check longer terms, this relation could even change to positive, as high GDP 
growth could lead the central bank to hike interest rates avoiding economic overheating. 
The U.S. yield curve as an economic health indicator degenerates towards a pure interest 
rate substitute and shows similar results as pure rates.  
 
7 Conclusion  
The regulatory context of banking regulations has gained much sophistication and com-
plexity since the first Basel accord was published. Today’s banks seem better prepared 
and better capitalized to endure volatile markets than in times before, as banking regula-
tion have paved the way. Evaluating the history of banking regulations extensively, a 
change in direction towards looser rules is not expected. On the contrary, capital require-
ments will grow over time, as regulators and countries want to successfully avoid bank 
rescue programs in the future. Also, economic developments of all kinds will encourage 
regulators to react and adapt the rules on a learning-by-doing basis. Even though some 
local rules like the Volcker Rule in the U.S. might be abandoned at some point, as eco-
nomic rationale seems to disappear or political will is no longer existing, the global trend 
seems to lead towards stricter rules. To further stabilize and level out the global financial 
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system, regulators will push more countries to apply the standardized Basel rules. Coun-
tries like Russia, Mexico and China will at some point adapt Basel rules, as their growing 
financial industry might otherwise endanger the economic stability by being too risk-
friendly. Some evidence of this thesis can already be found in the market, as these coun-
tries, not fully Basel III compliant, already issue CoCo bonds with a 2% low trigger or 
other non-compliant specifications, underlining their understanding of the importance of 
bank risk management.  
On the other hand, the highly sophisticated Basel approach towards CoCo bonds seems 
to be set. Alternative approaches when designing CoCo bonds do not seem realistic at the 
moment, even though numerous design possibilities were proposed by the existing liter-
ature. The accounting-based CET1 trigger and the regulatory-based PONV trigger are 
already established and will unlikely change. Especially CET1 triggers seem to be en-
trenched by the nature of Basel, focusing on RWA.  
 
The quantitative analysis revealed some helpful facts in understanding CoCo bonds. It 
can be stated that CoCo bonds have relied on equity markets over the last 3 years. Inter-
estingly, the bonds do not rely so much on the equity issued by the same bank, but rather 
on the global equity market in the form of indices. Single regression analysis even shows 
that more of the variance can be explained by the comprehensive EURO STOXX 50 
compared to the strongly focused EURO STOXX banks. Nevertheless, a currently unex-
plainable separation from the equity markets has taken place over the last six months. It 
can be stated that CoCo bonds seem to react to changes in the mood of cross-sector equity 
markets. Interest rates combined with distance to trigger are two other main variables 
explaining the variance of CoCo bonds, as interest rate seems to be the obvious one. Alt-
hough the distance to the trigger does not seem to be an omnipresent discussion topic in 
the CoCo market, a significant relationship can be proved. When implementing a simple 
adjusted system based on the dataset, a clear relation between the yield and the distance 
can be shown, which even changes the impact depending on the distance to the trigger. 
Figure 15 proofs this interesting relationship. Further, it was shown that CoCo bonds react 
stronger to GDP changes compared to benchmark indices, indicating a higher systemic 
sensitivity of CoCo bonds. Generally speaking, it can be concluded that economically 
important coefficients can be detected by the distance to the trigger, the EURO STOXX 
banks, the interest rate and the CDS global index. In addition, U.S. GDP QoQ has a very 
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high coefficient, losing a bit of its relevance due to the low probability of a 1% GDP 
move.  
 
In the future, more analyses like the ones carried out in this paper shall be done to further 
understand the drivers of this specific market. Even longer time frames will be available, 
helping to understand the behaviour of this market during different economic cycles, such 
as booms and recessions. An additional working paper could potentially be dedicated to 
the sudden drop in the correlation between equity markets and CoCo markets and try to 
explain the reason behind this market move. Also, different central bank interest rates 
cycles will be analysed, which was not possible in this time frame. Additionally, more 
precedents like Banco Popular or Banco Espírito Santo will emerge to further understand 
how the full lifecycle of a CoCo bond works in different jurisdictions when applying 
unequal laws. It will also further enhance the understanding of how the design of CoCo 
bonds influences the loss-absorption process.  
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9 Appendix 
 
1. Issued and paid-in  
2. Subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank  
3. Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or 
other arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the 
claim vis-à-vis bank creditors  
4. Is perpetual, i.e. there is no maturity date and there are no step-ups or other in-
centives to redeem  
5. May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five 
years: 
To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval; and  
A bank must not do anything which creates an expectation that the call will be 
exercised; and  
Banks must not exercise a call unless:  
They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better quality and 
the replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are sustainable for 
the income capacity of the bank; or  
The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum capi-
tal requirements after the call option is exercised. 
6. Any repayment of principal (through repurchase or redemption) must be with 
prior supervisory approval and banks should not assume or create market ex-
pectations that supervisory approval will be given  
7. Dividend/coupon discretion:  
the bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel distributions/payments 
cancellation of discretionary payments must not be an event of default  
banks must have full access to cancelled payments to meet obligations as they 
fall due  
cancellation of distributions/payments must not impose restrictions on the bank 
except in relation to distributions to common stockholders.  
8. Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items  
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9. The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that is a divi-
dend/coupon that is reset periodically based in whole or in part on the banking 
organisation’s credit standing.  
10. The instrument cannot contribute to liabilities exceeding assets if such a balance 
sheet test forms part of national insolvency law.  
11. Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal 
loss absorption through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective 
pre-specified trigger point or (ii) a write-down mechanism which allocates 
losses to the instrument at a pre-specified trigger point. The write-down will 
have the following effects:  
Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation;  
Reduce the amount re-paid when a call is exercised; and  
Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the instrument.  
12. Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or 
significant influence can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank di-
rectly or indirectly have funded the purchase of the instrument  
13. The instrument cannot have any features that hinder recapitalisation, such as 
provisions that require the issuer to compensate investors if a new instrument is 
issued at a lower price during a specified time frame  
14. If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the holding company 
in the consolidated group (a special purpose vehicle – “SPV”), proceeds must 
be immediately available without limitation to an operating entity or the holding 
company in the consolidated group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the 
other criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital  
Table 11: Criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, 2011, pp. 15-17) 
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Figure 11: Detailed correlation matrix 
 
 
Figure 12: Correlation yield vs. equity price 
 
 
Figure 13: Regression model with distance to trigger 
 
CoCo Bonds - What drives their yields compared to benchmarks and on a standalone basis?
   
 
- 60 - 
 
Figure 14: Regression model with all distances to trigger 
 
 
Figure 15: Correlation matrix for equity indices, bonds and benchmarks 
 
 
Figure 16: Multiple regression analysis corporate bonds excluding banks index 
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Figure 17: Multiple regression analysis senior bank bonds index 
 
Independent variable Contribution nominal / percentage of 
Interest Rate 0.033647 / 3.66% 0.103043 / 16.20% 
EURO STOXX banks 0.007901 / 0.86% 0.09859 / 15.50% 
EURO STOXX non-banks 0.000822 / 0.09% 0.003199 / 0.50% 
US 3m vs. 10yr 0.033046 / 3.60% 0.003499 / 0.55 % 
US GDP QoQ 0.005407 / 0.59% 0.014132 / 2.22% 
CDS global index 0.126114 / 13.73% 0.097447 / 15.32% 
EURO STOXX banks and non-banks 
combined 
0.009256 / 1.01% 0.030287 / 4.76% 
EURO STOXX banks, non-banks and 
CDS global index 
0.217939 / 23.73% 0.253896 / 39.92% 
 of the multi regression:  0.918283 /100% 0.63604 / 100% 
BB corporate excl. financials index 
 
Barclays Bloomberg senior financial insti-
tutions index 
Table 12: Contribution to variance explanation multiple regression benchmark 
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Figure 18: Distance to trigger distribution 
